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Introduction
Competitive balance is an important feature of sports
leagues. If the outcome of a contest or a season is nearly
certain, demand may begin to decline. Competitive bal-
ance can refer to the season-long race between teams for
a league title or the closeness or uncertainty of each con-
test. As pointed out by Fort and Quirk (1992), competi-
tive balance can also refer to the variation in champions
from season to season. Further, competitive balance
could refer to the closeness of a contest within the game
itself, i.e., is the outcome of the game uncertain all the
way up to the end of the game or has it been decided early
on? If uncertainty of each game is important to cus-
tomers, then the ex ante probability that the home team
wins a particular game should be about 0.5 in order to
maximize sales (e.g., attendance at sporting events or
viewership on television). On the other hand, if fans want
the home team to prevail in a particular contest, then the
optimal ex ante probability that the home team will win
should approach 1.0. If both of these components of
demand are true, then the optimal probability will lay
somewhere between 0.5 and 1.0.
In aggregate, there are as many wins in a season as there
are losses. However, in order to increase fan enjoyment
and maximize league revenue, each team should win
more often at home. Therefore, it is optimal for leagues
to attempt to maintain competitive balance throughout
the season and concurrently have home teams win more
often.
Can sport managers influence the desired home court
advantage needed to produce a probability between 0.5
and 1.0? While outside of the scope of this article, there
appears to be some natural home field advantages that
help the home team play well such as (1) familiarity with
the field or court, (2) the home crowd energizing the
home team, and (3) negligible travel weariness compared
to what the visiting team faces. In some sports, the sur-
face, size, and even shape of the court or field can be
manipulated by the home team in order to improve the
home field advantage.
For instance, in Major League Baseball (MLB), owners
have been known to install artificial turf if their team is
exceptionally fast or hits a lot of grounders and line drives
because the turf (unlike grass) will not slow the ball down
as much, allowing it to travel further into the outfield. The
St. Louis Cardinals of the 1980s were thought to have ben-
efited from this because they were not a power hitting
team, but did have a lot of fast runners in their line-up.
Also, some home team groundskeepers would water down
the area near first base when Rickey Henderson, the career
leader in stolen bases in MLB, would arrive for a series of
games against the home team, because it would hinder his
ability to get a good jump and steal bases. This provides an
advantage over homerun hitting teams. Similarly, the dis-
tance to the outfield fence can be brought in to produce
many more homeruns or pushed further out to benefit a
team with fast outfielders and batters who hit line drives,
but not many homeruns. The Cleveland Indians purport-
edly pushed out their fence when they had the speedy cen-
ter fielder Kenny Lofton. Fast teams in American football
often like to play on artificial turf in order to accentuate
their speed advantage. In the National Basketball
Association (NBA), the court size and surface are essential-
ly fixed by the league, preventing the home team from
varying the home field/court advantage above and beyond
the natural home field advantages listed above.
This research is an investigation of the ex ante optimal
probability that a home team wins a game using data
from the 2001-2002 NBA season. One result is an esti-
mate of this optimal probability. The term "optimal" is
based on the assumption that a team wants to maximize
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attendance at its home games, or that the maximization
of attendance is a good proxy for the maximization of
other objectives such as profits or revenues (or even
wins). K6senne and Pauwels (2006) discuss how owner
objectives tend to vary across leagues, continents, and
even within leagues, and that real implications exist for
talent demand, salaries, and competitive balance.
It has been shown that a team has a higher probability
of winning a game when there are more of its fans in the
stands (see Boyd & Boyd, 1998). Thus, maximizing atten-
dance might be optimal for a win-maximizing franchise
owner. Similarly, attendance has often been used in the
literature as a proxy for revenue with the understanding
that ticket prices are set prior to the season. Therefore,
given a certain level for ticket prices, a franchise ought to
want to maximize attendance. Finally, the bulk of the
costs for an NBA team are fixed, not variable. Profit max-
imization is, thus, aligned with revenue maximization.
Overall, whether or not an individual owner is a win
maximizer, profit maximizer, or combination of the two,
drawing the largest crowds possible is almost certainly
going to be aligned with those broader objectives.
Moreover, Bollinger and Hotchkiss (2003) reason that
profit maximization (or near profit maximization) is
likely to be the most common objective in Major League
Baseball, for instance.
However, the cost of creating a team that can win at
home more than on the road might outweigh the net
financial gain from the associated higher attendance, thus
causing a divergence between attendance maximization
and profit maximization. Disentangling that issue is
beyond the scope of this research.
Other results of this study include the effect of Michael
Jordan on demand, and an analysis of the diminishing
effect of a previous season's performance on demand as
the season progresses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides a brief review of the literature on competitive
balance and its effect on demand. The next section
reviews the theory that predicts that the optimal proba-
bility should be between 0.5 and 1.0. Section IV describes
the data and methodology used, while Section V shows
the analysis and results. The final section concludes and
discusses the importance of the findings.
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Previous Literature
In his article titled "Peculiar economics of professional
sports," Neale (1964) first noted that competitors desired
other quality competitors. Today, this notion of greater
competition having a positive effect on a firm's bottom
line is termed limited positive production network external-
ity. Up to a point, more competitors are better than
fewer, or higher quality competitors are better than lower
quality competitors-a major exception to classical eco-
nomic theory. In other words, higher revenues depend on
increased on-the-field competition between teams. In
order to achieve competitive games, league management
have instituted numerous rules-starting in 1876 with
the reserve system in baseball-to the current set of poli-
cies that include rookie drafts, salary caps, luxury taxes,
and revenue sharing. Fort (2002) and Leeds and von
Allmen (2002) discuss league rules for increasing com-
petitive balance. The efficacy of these rules in increasing
or maintaining competitive balance is currently under
debate (see Fort & Quirk, 1992; Sanderson, 2002; and
Rascher, 2002, for different perspectives on this debate).
There have been dozens of studies performed on sport
to determine how a variety of factors affect attendance or
demand. In the early studies, Demmert (1973) and Noll
(1974) found that absolute quality was in fact a significant
determinant of attendance for baseball. More recently,
Knowles, Sherony, and Haupert (1992) explain how
uncertainty of outcome assumes that spectators increase
their utility through sporting events that have a higher
level of unpredictability, and that more evenly matched
teams will yield less certain outcomes and thus, higher
attendance. Some of the other demand factors analyzed
include star players (Noll, 1974; Schurr, Wittig, Ruble, &
Ellen, 1987; Schwartz, 1973; Scully, 1974), game schedules
(Hill, Madura, & Zuber, 1982), and ticket prices (Bird,
1982; Boyd & Boyd, 1998; Siegfried & Eisenberg, 1980).
Butler (2002) includes a recent bibliography of studies of
the determinants of demand for sporting events. Using a
sample of 1988 Major League Baseball games, Knowles et
al. (1992) found that the ex ante attendance maximizing
probability that the home team would win a game is about
0.60. Rascher (1999) used data for the entire 1996 MLB
season and concluded that the ex ante optimal probability
that the home team would win was between 0.60 and 0.67,
depending on the specification.
Theory
The theory being tested in this article is based on the
sports league model developed by Rascher (1997). It con-
tains both absolute and relative quality of play and com-
petition as factors of demand. The model directly shows
that the ex ante optimal probability that the home team
wins a game is between 0.5 and 1.0. The empirical analy-
sis that follows will help determine where the optimal
probability will fall within that range.
The demand function takes the form
Qh = Si(ATi + BTj + C(Ti - T-)2 + other), (1)
with the restriction that A>B>O>C. Ti is the talent level of
team i, while T is the talent level of team j. Qh is the
demand for home games. A is the marginal propensity to
attend home games with respect to the home team's qual-
ity. B is the marginal propensity to attend home games
with respect to the visiting team's quality, and is assumed
to be less important than home team quality to the home-
town fans. C is the marginal propensity to attend home
games that is attributable to the uncertainty of the contest
outcome. The more divergent the talent levels of the two
teams, the lower the demand. Si is a scalar that controls
for the potential demand from market size, income, tick-
et prices, and other factors that vary across cities and over
time. The restrictions on A, B, and C show that demand
is maximized with respect to the home team's talent (Ti),
by finding the maximum of the quadratic equation nest-
ed within the demand curve. The result is that Qh is max-
imized when Ti = T1 -(A/2C). Given that talent is not
measured directly, winning percentage is a monotonic
function of talent. Similarly, in order to determine the
probability that the home team wins a particular game
(Ph), the current winning percentage of the home team
(wi; at home and on the road) and visiting team (wj) can
be used to create a monotonic function of the home
team's winning percentage:(-w.)wi (2)
Ph J
wi (1- w-) + wj(1 - wi)
Hence, winning percentage is a proxy for talent and can
be turned into a probability formula. The Appendix con-
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tains a derivation of the probability function. The empiri-
cal analysis will use a quadratic of the probability function,
not talent, which cannot effectively be measured.
The hypotheses being tested are: (1) the absolute qual-
ity of the two teams is an important determinant of
demand (A and B are both positive and significant), (2)
home town fans are more sensitive to changes in the
home team's talent level than to changes in the visiting
team's talent level (A > B), and (3) fans want to see games
where the outcome is uncertain (C < 0 and significant).
Additionally, a direct estimate of the optimal (from the
league's perspective) ex ante probability that the home
team wins a particular game will be generated.
Data and Methodology
The data includes information regarding each NBA game
for the 2001-2002 regular season. There are 25 variables
for each of the 1,189 observations (based on 29 NBA
teams playing 82 games each).
Dependent Variables
Two different variables are used to define demand for
each data set. One, a binary variable, "sell-out," translates
to a measure of the probability that there was an occur-
rence of a sell-out or near sell-out (greater than 95% of
the capacity sold out). The second dependent variable is
attendance.
Sell-outs, according to the definition used in this study,
occurred 446 times over the entire regular season.
Attendance ranged from 5,234 to 35,052 with a mean of
16,975 and a standard deviation of 3,598. Table 1 pro-
vides a summary of the data.
Time-Constant Independent Variables
Certain factors of demand are constant over time, but
vary across teams. Population is a typical factor of
demand for sporting events. The population of the
Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA),
measured in millions, is used in this analysis and is
expected to have a positive effect on attendance. Median
household income and the unemployment rate are also
included as potential determinants of demand. The
expected effect of income is positive and unemployment
negative, if NBA games are, in fact, normal goods. The
percentage of the local population that is not white has
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historically been found to be negatively associated with
NBA attendance. Noll (1974), Kahn and Sherer (1988),
and Kanazawa and Funk (2001) each found a negative
correlation between the racial characteristics of the local
population and attendance at NBA games.
As with any demand function, ticket price is expected
to have a negative effect on attendance. Most previous
research, however, has not found a strong link between
ticket price and demand (Fort & Quirk, 1992; Fort,
2005). However, Coates and Harrison, (2005) using
instrumental variables estimation (IV) on a number of
different ticket price definitions, find inelastic pricing
that was statistically significant for MLB. The variation in
ticket price in their analysis was across teams and over a
number of years. In this study of NBA teams, the ticket
price variable is constant for each game and only varies
across teams; thus, IV estimation is not applicable.
Average ticket price is included in the analysis to cap-
ture the cost of attending an NBA game. In 2001-02 it
ranged from $26.38 (Golden State Warriors) up to $65.95
(New York Knicks), with an average of $41.91. The full
cost of attending a basketball game includes much more
than just the ticket price. The Fan Cost IndexTM (FCI)
includes the cost of concessions, parking, and some mer-
chandise. It ranges from US$175.35 (Toronto Raptors) to
$357.90 (New York Knicks) with a league average of
$244.44.
Lastly, home and visiting team previous season records
are included. These records are measured using home
and visiting season wins, which ranged from 15 to 58 with
a mean of 41 and a binary variable to denote if the home
and/or visiting team made the playoff in the previous sea-
son. These two variables are expected to have a positive
effect on attendance because season ticket decisions are
often based on previous season's quality, given that is the
bulk of the information available on expected team per-
formance.
Time-Varying Independent Variables
The determinants of demand that vary from game to
game are grouped into player quality, team quality, and
the context of the game. The NBA promotes individual
players relatively more than other sports leagues, which
focus on marketing the teams themselves. The star player
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Table 1: 2001-2002 National Basketball Association Game-by-Game Statistics.
D~ependent Variable: Minimum lanNxXun
Attendance 5,234 16,975 35,052
Whether a Game was Sold Out 0 0.38 1
Time-Constant Variables:
Number of Home Team Previous Season Wins 15 41 58
Home Team Previous Season Playoff Team 0 0.59 1
Fan Cost Index (FCI) 175.35 244.35 357.9
Ticket Price (as reported in FCI) $26.38 $41.91 $65.95
Median Household Income in CMSA $26,543 $45,655 $61,466
Percentage Non-white in CMSA 0.035 0.33 0.717
Population of CMSA (In Millions) 0.36 3.52 16.3
Unemployment Rate of CMSA 0.005 0.06 0.098
Stadium Seating 16,285 19,670 22,879
Game-by-Game Variables:
Estimated Probability the Home Team Will Win 0 0.50 1
Home Win/Loss Percentage 0 0.49 1
Visitor Win/Loss Percentage 0 0.49 1
Average Difference in Win Percentages 0 0.18 1
Home Win Percentage in Last Ten Games 0 0.49 1
Visitor Win Percentage in Last Ten Games 0 0.50 1
Number of All-Stars Playing 0 1.62 4
Michael Jordan Playing in Game 0 0.05 1
Scoring Leaders Playing 0 0.63 2
Rebounding Leaders Playing 0 0.62 2
Assist Leaders Playing 0 0.60 2
Number of Defensive Team Members Playing 0 0.67 4
Game is on a Weekend 0 0.30 1
Home Opener 0 0.02 1
Visiting Team Previous Season Number of Wins 15 41 58
Visiting Team Previous Season Playoff Team 0 0.59 1
Notes:
(1) There are 1,189 observations.
(2) The data is for the regular season only.
(3) The data is from www.sfo.com/-csuppes/NBA/index.htm, www.nba.com, U.S. Census, Statistics Canada, and
Team Marketing Report.
(4) The All-Star category is based on whether the player was in the All-Star game during the 2001-2002 season. The
scoring, rebounding, and assist leader variables are based on the final tally at the end of the season, but clearly indicates
the leaders at the time. The defensive players were those who made the 1st Team NBA All-Defensive Team during the
2001-2002 season.
134 Volume 2 • Number 3 • 2007 IJSF
attributes consist of factors measuring the number of All-
Star team members, the number of Top 10 scoring lead-
ers, rebounding leaders, and assist leaders, and the
number of top defensive players in each game. Each of
these is expected to have a positive affect on attendance.
A separate indicator variable is used for games in which
Michael Jordan appears. His impact is expected to be
greater than that of simply an All-Star player. Hausman
and Leonard (1997) estimated that Michael Jordan gen-
erated approximately $53 million in incremental atten-
dance and merchandise revenues for all of the other teams
in the NBA for the 1991-92 season. Their findings do not
include revenue generated for his team or any other rev-
enue streams for any teams, such as media revenues or
concessions sales. Home opening game and weekend
game (Saturday and Sunday) indicator variables are
included as factors of demand. The home opener satisfies
the pent-up demand from the off-season. Fans presum-
ably have more time available to attend weekend games.
Other research on baseball has shown the significant
impact of opening day and weekend games. A weekend
Major League Baseball game has a 25% higher atten-
dance, ceteris paribus (Rascher, 1999).
The key variables of interest are those that account for
absolute and relative team quality. The home team's cur-
rent winning percentage and the visiting team's current
winning percentage are utilized to create a number of
variables: the difference between the home and visiting
team's winning percentages, the probability that the
home team wins a game, and the probability squared.1 As
described above, these will allow for the estimation of the
optimal probability that the home team wins.
Analysis and Results
There are three models examined in this analysis. The
first model tests whether A>B>O>C, which would show
that an important set of assumptions in the competitive
balance model are true. Again, the assumptions are that
the attendees care about the absolute quality of teams on
the field (A > 0 and B > 0), they care about close contests
or relative quality (0 > C), and they care more about the
home team's quality than the visiting team's quality (A >
B). The second model directly estimates the ex ante opti-
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mal probability that the home team wins the game. The
third model also estimates the same probability, but uses
an indicator variable of whether a game was nearly sold
out instead of attendance as the measure of demand.
Using the percentage of capacity sold out is one way to
account for the truncation of the attendance variable.
The number of truncated games is significant. During the
2001-2002 season, approximately 37% of games recorded
capacity sold out of greater than 95%. Another way to
account for truncation of the dependent variable is to use
a censored regression (similar to a tobit) that effectively
estimates what attendance would be if there were not a
capacity issue.
The first model is estimated using a censored regression
that accounts for the occasional truncation of the depend-
ent variable, attendance. Sensitivity analyses show that
multicollinearity exists across the various measures of win-
ning (winning percentage, last ten games winning percent-
age, previous season winning percentage, previous season
playoffs). Thus, the final analysis removed the winning
percentage over the last ten games variable and the previ-
ous season playoffs variable. As expected, serial correlation
is not a problem, given that the data spans less than one
year. The data are distributed approximately normal
except for the dummy variables, which is typical. Further,
the errors have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity.
The second model uses the same estimation methods as
the first model. However, multicollinearity is not an issue
because there is only one measure of winning for the
home and visiting teams-the probability that each team
wins (see Appendix for a derivation).
The dependent variable in the third model is a dummy
variable that equals I for games in which attendance is at
least 95% of capacity, and 0 otherwise. A probit analysis
is used to estimate this model. This model is included for
comprehensiveness, and specifically, as another way to
account for the problem of sell-outs. However, as with all
dummy variables, the dependent variable is a cruder
measure of something else, attendance.
A second set of analyses is prepared to provide more
meaning for some of the independent variables. For
instance, the home team winning percentage near the
beginning of the season is very erratic because there are
not many games in the denominator of the calculation.
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Table 2: Regression Results: Full Season
Adjusted R-Squared or Pseudo R-Squared
F-Value or Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared
Number of Observations
Optimal Probability Home Team Wins
Independent Variables:
Constant
Home Team Win/Loss Percentage
Home Team Win/Loss Percentage Squared
Visiting Team Win/Loss Percentage
Visiting Team Win/Loss Percentage Squared
Difference in Win/Loss Percentages
Difference in Win/Loss Percentages Squared
Probability Home Team Wins
0.41 0.31 0.14
35.92 34.34 226.61
1189 1189 1189
--- 0.67 0.66
-3353.01***
(-6.53)
7424.61***
(3.69)
-4875.14***
(-2.55)
3507.10
(1.07)
-2062.50
(-0.99)
381.93
(0.57)
-344.19
(-0.49)
11
J.SL a..LLLy UJ C. a na,.L qV --11- .
Home Team Previous Season Wins 93.29***
(6.21)
Visiting Team Previous Season Wins 5.68
(0.48)
Michael Jordan 4235.76*** 2
(9.89)
All-Star Team Members (2001-02 Season) 72.12
(0.71)
Assist Leaders (Top 10, 2001-02 Season) -792.23***
(-6.06)
Defensive Team Members (2001-02 Season) 323.13***
(2.61)
Weekend Game 872.15***
(4.93)
Fan Cost IndexTM (FCI) 
-1.87
(-0.87)
Median Household Income in Local CMSA 0.033**
(2.30)
Non-White Percentage in Local CMSA -10.17
(-1.34)
Population of Local CMSA (in Millions) 118.60***
(4.83)
Unemployment Rate in Local CMSA (%) 44491.05*** 26
(6.72)
T-statistics are in parentheses. Significance: * - 10% level; ** - 5% level; * - 1% level.
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.340.87***
(2.73)
8500.70**
(-2.05)
:290.80***
(5.82)
518.72***
(5.12)
723.39***
(-5.11)
552.44***
(4.66)
767.78***
(3.99)
5.72***
(3.99)
-0.048***
(-3.62)
-16.35**
(-1.98)
65.53***
(2.51)
728.90***
(3.91)
3.39*
(1.65)
-2.55
(-1.25)
2.32***
(6.76)
0.15***
(3.31)
-0.070
(-1.08)
0.18***
(3.42)
0.35***
(4.08)
0.00086
(0.88)
-0.000018***
(-2.75)
-0.053
(-0.15)
-0.0091
(-0.79)
-0.48
(-0.14)
This is also true for all of the other winning-related vari-
ables. The second analyses use data after approximately
36% of the season has been played (from January 2002 to
the end of the regular season).
The results for all three models using the full season of
data are shown in Table 2. As the competitive balance
theory predicts, the home team's winning percentage
effect was found to be positive, but greater than the visit-
ing team's winning percentage effect (A > B > 0), show-
ing that fans respond relatively more to changes in their
home team's quality than that of the visiting team.
Further, the squared difference in winning percentages
has a negative impact on attendance, implying that fans
care about close contests, all else equal (C < 0).
The probability model generates an estimate of the
optimal ex ante probability that the home team wins a
game. The inclusion of the variable "Probability Home
Team Wins" (PROB) and its squared term in the equa-
tion in Table 2 creates a quadratic relationship between
Attendance and PROB. The attendance maximizing solu-
tion to this equation,
Attendance = f(aPROB + bPROB2 ), (3)
is PROB = -a/(2b). Demand is maximized when this
probability is about 67% (i.e., -a/(2b) = -11,340/(2*(-
8,500)) = 67%), or when the home team has twice the
chance as the visiting team to win the basketball game.
Likewise, the Sell-out Model, using the indicator variable
as the dependent variable, finds a similar optimal proba-
bility of 66%.
There are a number of other interesting findings. The
average change in attendance from an increase in home
team quality shows that obtaining one more win during
the middle of the season (21-21 record to 22-20; a
0.02381 increase in winning percentage) leads to an
increase in attendance of about 177 fans per game. This is
a gain of over 1% per game for each extra win. While
NBA attendance varies much less than many other sports,
the weekend effect was still relatively large at approxi-
mately 800 additional attendees per game (an increase of
nearly 5% per game).
Michael Jordan was one of the most demand-inducing
team-sport athletes in North America during the time
period. All 56 games in which he appeared in 2001-2002
were sell-outs. His team, the Washington Wizards, sold
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out each of its 41 home games, including 10 games in
which Jordan did not play. For a few teams, the home
games against Jordan and his team were one of only a few
that sold out.' On the other hand, there were some teams
that sold out many games with Jordan playing in either
one or none of them (e.g., New York Knicks, Sacramento
Kings, and Dallas Mavericks).
This analysis provides evidence in support of that argu-
ment. When comparing individual player effects, Michael
Jordan draws more fans than the equivalent of four All-
Stars or defensive team members. Based on the findings
in Table 2 and Table 3, Michael Jordan drew about 3,000
more fans per game than would otherwise be the case.
That is an increase of about 18%. That is likely to be a
conservative estimate, given that each game he played in
sold out. In other words, the true demand for his games
was likely higher than the capacity at the basketball arena
in which the game took place.
There were multicollinearity problems with scoring
leaders, rebounding leaders, and number of All-Stars
playing in the game. The final model chosen excluded
scoring leaders and rebounding leaders in favor of the
number of All-Stars.
The analysis based on the latter two-thirds of the season
provides some expected results. The goodness-of-fit is
higher, most likely because the winning-related variables
are more stable and meaningful than for the entire season.
As a season progresses, the impact of the results of the pre-
vious season on demand are expected to diminish. The
effect of the home team's previous season is smaller than
it is for the entire season, dropping from 93 fans per game
for each additional win during the prior season to 77.
Conclusion and Discussion
Fans desire games in which the home team is expected
to win, but not with certainty. In the early years of pro-
fessional basketball, regional leagues would form and
exist until one team dominated the circuit and the league
faltered (Neft & Cohen, 1991). Fans did not want certain-
ty in the games, but wanted true contests where the out-
comes were uncertain. Today the concept of competitive
balance is as important as it was a century ago. Leagues
create rules in order to promote and maintain a desired
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Table 3: Regression Results: January Through the End of the Season.
Adjusted R-Squared or Pseudo R-Squared 0.44 0.37 0.14
F-Value or Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared 24.81 30.5 148.05
Number of Observations 757 757 757
Optimal Probability Home Team Wins 
--- 0.60 0.61
Independent Variables:
Constant 
-12490.86***
(-3.76)
Home Team Win/Loss Percentage 4751.80
(0.85)
Home Team Win/Loss Percentage Squared 2989.54
(0.54)
Visiting Team Win/Loss Percentage 2792.41
(0.56)
Visiting Team Win/Loss Percentage Squared 2946.57
(0.57)
Difference in Win/Loss Percentages 
-259.72
(-0.15)
Difference in Win/Loss Percentages Squared -1332.40
(-0.78) ......
Probability Home Team Wins 
--- 35418.28*** 11.92*
(2.53) (1.79)
Probability Home Team Wins Squared --- -29652.20** -9.77
(-2.14) (-1.48)
Home Team Previous Season Wins 77.45***
(3.65 ) ......
Visiting Team Previous Season Wins 14.96
(0.96) ......
Michael Jordan 3700.02*** 3086.40*** 2.038***
(5.84) (4.87) (4.46)
All-Star Team Members (2001-02 Season) -325.14**
(-2.27) ......
Assist Leaders (Top 10, 2001-02 Season) -705.69*** -537.003*** -0.0028***
(-4.26) (-3.18) (-4.46)
Defensive Team Members (2001-02 Season) 23.55 308.24 0.094
(0.14) (2.02) (1.35)
Weekend Game 1141.53*** 1131.72*** 0.45***
(5.23) (4.91) (4.14)
Fan Cost IndexTM (FCI) 
-1.81 1.50 -0.00050
(-0.67) (0.55) (-0.40)
Median Household Income in Local CMSA 0.027 -0.043*** -0.000012
(1.35) (-2.63) (-1.51)
Non-White Percentage in Local CMSA -1042.57 -5127.20*** 0.19
(-0.97) (-5.49) (0.41)
Population of Local CMSA (in Millions) 120.70*** 102.46*** 0.0063
(3.75) (3.08) (0.43)
Unemployment Rate in Local CMSA (%) 38437.53*** 37890.74*** -1.14
(4.84)
T-statistics are in parentheses. Significance: * - 10% level; ** - 5% level; * - 1% level.
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level of competitive balance. However, individual teams
try to create a home court advantage that allows them to
win more often at home. A consequence of this is that, in
equilibrium, they will lose more games on the road
(because of similar measures by opposing teams), there-
by not disturbing overall competitive balance (as meas-
ured by the dispersion of wins across teams throughout
the season), but rather, distributing the wins to occur
more often at home.
This paper estimated the optimal ex ante probability
that the home team would win a game for the National
Basketball Association during the 2001-02 season. Team
winning percentages were turned into probabilities of
winning and, along with other control variables, were
analyzed to determine their effect on demand. The ex
ante optimal probability that the home team would win
was calculated to be about 66% for the full season and
about 60% for the last 757 games.3 Findings for baseball
concluded that the optimal probability was about 70%.
Economic theory would actually predict the opposite, but
only slightly. The shorter the season, the more dominant
a team has to be in order to ensure success (e.g., making
the playoffs) because one bad game has more impact on
success. If fans understand this, then they would want the
home team to win with more certainty for a sport with a
shorter season, such as basketball, than for a sport with a
longer season, such as baseball. It becomes apparent that
when basketball fans are assumed to be rational con-
sumers, they are slightly more concerned with seeing
competitive games than with seeing their team have cer-
tain success.
Another analysis was performed to test a theoretical
demand model whose main features are (1) local fans
want the home team to be of high quality, (2) fans want
the visiting team to also be of high quality, although it is
less important than that for the home team, and (3) fans
want the outcome of the contest to be uncertain, not pre-
determined. The results supported the theoretical model.
A question was placed on the cover of Sports Illustrated
on March 10th, 1997: "Are the Bulls so good they're bad
for the NBA?" In theory the answer is "Yes." The Bulls
had a record of 69-13 in the 1996-97 season on their way
to another championship. However, the Bulls sold out all
of their games that season anyway because of absolute
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quality of play and a desire to see the spectacle of Michael
Jordan and company play. If that dominance were to
have continued for years, it could have led the NBA to
become dull and pre-determined. The positive effect on
demand of a star player dominating a sport compared
with the negative effect of the loss of uncertainty of out-
come is not fully understood. It appears that the star
effect is larger than the uncertainty of outcome effect, but
that might not be the case if the particular star effect were
to continue unabated for a long period of time, and thus,
cause games and seasons to become predictable.
There is some current evidence of this in certain soccer
leagues in Europe where a few teams with star players
dominate each season (see Lago, Simmons, & Szymanski,
2006), causing the fans of the second tier clubs to lost
interest, and historically in MLB when the New York
Yankees dominated baseball in the 1920s and saw declines
in attendance at home games and for other teams in the
league. Similarly, the original American Basketball League
(in the 1920s) suffered because of competitive imbalance
issues. Recent research by Paul and Weinbach (2007)
shows that the expected uncertainty of outcome is an
important determinant in the number of fans watching
National Football League games on television.
As discussed above, these findings help focus a league
on the amount of home court advantage that it should
want each team to have. How can teams improve home
court advantage? There is a belief that one aspect of home
court advantage is the crowd providing emotional energy
to the home team players and well-placed noise to disrupt
the opponent. Research shows that sporting events with
higher attendances improve the chances of the home
team winning the game (Boyd & Boyd, 1998; Liu, Li,
Wang, & Liu, 2002). One source of home court advantage
is familiarity with the playing surface and lighting (St.
John, 2003). Another source of home court advantage is
the noise created by the home team's sound system
(Bailey, 2001). A commonly discussed source that a home
team does not have control over is the wear on the body
from travel. Also, referees are often accused of making
calls to benefit the home team. Some believe that various
leagues support this in order to satisfy the home team
crowds, but no recent concrete evidence of this has been
found for major North American sports leagues.
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An important area of future research is to determine
how to change home court advantage and the effects of
each method so leagues can determine how much lenien-
cy to give. In baseball, the home team can change the size
of the field to fit its talent, but not in basketball. Also,
what are the findings for sports outside of North
America, and if they are significantly different, then why?
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Endnotes
' To be clear, the home team's current winning percentage is
the winning percentage of the home team for a specific game
prior to the start of the game. It is not a reflection of the per-
centage of home games a team has won up to that point.
2 One of the two sellouts for the Charlotte Hornets, one of the
four sellouts for the Chicago Bulls (Jordan's former team), one
of the three sellouts for the Cleveland Cavaliers, one of the
three sellouts for the Houston Rockets, and two of the three
sellouts for the Miami Heat were games against Jordan and his
teammates.
SIt should be noted that this is an average across each NBA
team and it is likely that the optimal probability varies across
teams.
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Appendix
This shows the derivation of the probability that the home team will win a particular game based on winning per-
centages (Fort & Quirk, 1995).
If Ti and T are the playing strengths of team i and j, then the probability that team i beats team j is
T; . (4)
Prob(i beats j) Ti +
The expected winning percentage of team i when playing an average team is
Wi = Ti
wiVi + nT - T(5)
where T is the average strength of each team in the league, and n is the number of teams in the league. Solving equa-
tions (4) and (5) for Ti and T leads to
nTwi
(n - 1) - (n -2) wi (6)
and
nTwiTj= (n - 1) - (n - 2) wj (7)
Plugging back into equation (4) and letting n go to infinity yields the probability equation based on winning percent-
ages
(1- w. wi
wfl = wi( -w) + wj(]1- wi) (8)
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